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This Brief is submitted pursuant to the Order of the 
Court dated July 21, 1988, permitting the Counties of Duchesne 
and Uintah, Utah, to file a response to the brief of the Ute 
Tribe. The argument in the Brief of Amicus Curiae, Ute Indian 
Tribe, filed on July 21, 1988, solely addresses the point of 
Appellant's status as an Indian. Accordingly, Amici will limit 
the discussion here to that issue. 
The central issue on appeal is whether the alleged 
criminal act by Perank occurred within Indian Country as 
defined by 18 U.S.C. §1151. Even though the reservation 
boundary is central to this case, the Ute Tribe would like to 
avoid having the Utah Supreme Court independently determine the 
boundary issue. Both Perank and the State of Utah concur that 
Perank is an Indian for the purposes of this case. 
Nonetheless, the Ute Tribe has asserted that Perank was not an 
Indian at the time that Utah exercised jurisdiction over him 
and, therefore, hoping that the boundary issue would 
disappear. Thus, a determination of the reservation's boundary 
is the only means available to any court to adjudge its 
jurisdiction. However, even on the issue of Perank's Indian 
status, the argument of the Ute Tribe concerning Perank's 
status as an Indian completely misses the mark because the 
Tribe links the absence of Perank's tribal membership to the 
jurisdiction of the State. 
Amici contend that Appellant's status as an Indian is 
ascertained from judicially created federal doctrines, and not 
solely from the membership rolls politically determined by the 
Ute Tribal Business Committee. As noted in Felix S. Cohen's 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law; 
Some people therefore can be an Indian for one 
purpose, but not for another, F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed.) Ch. 
1, Sec. C2 (p. 26). 
It is therefore necessary to determine the 
specific purpose for which Indian identity is 
relevant. A conclusion may then be reached in 
the context of the statute or other provision 
in question. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law (1982 ed.) Ch. 1, Sec. C (p. 20). 
Notwithstanding the invitation to comment, the Ute 
Tribe ignores the boundary issue. Instead, the Ute Tribe 
erroneously suggests that the parties have neglected to address 
Appellant's "Indian status". This is not true. The issue was 
thoroughly discussed and resolved by both parties concurring 
that, given the state of the record below, Perank has 
established that he is an Indian for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§1151. See, Brief of Appellant at 4-10, Utah v. Perank, No. 
860243, (Utah S. Ct., filed Aug. 4, 1986); Brief of Respondent 
at 48-49, Utah v. Perank, No. 860196 (S. Ct. No. 860243) (Utah 
Ct. App., filed March 4, 1987); See also, Amicus Curiae Brief 
of Duchesne and Uintah Counties in Support of Respondent, Add. 
at 84-86 (Ute Bulletin, April 27, 1988), Utah v. Perank, No. 
860196 (S. Ct. No. 860243) (Utah S. Ct., filed July 1, 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
Amici agree with the conclusion of Respondent State of 
Utah that: 
Given the state of the record, it cannot be 
said that Perank's status as an Indian under 
18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 was not 
established below, Brief for Respondent, at 
49, Utah v. Perank, No. 860196 (S. Ct. No. 
860243) (Utah Ct. App., filed March 4, 1987). 
R. . (emphasis added). 
This statement, based as it is upon a fair analysis of the 
record and the evidentiary materials properly before this 
Court, should be dispositive of Perank's status as an Indian 
now raised by the Ute Tribe. Accordingly, Amici will only 
comment upon the authorities relied upon by the Ute Tribe. 
In essence, the Tribe argues that Perank could not be 
an 18 U.S.C. §1153 "Indian" until the Tribe's governing body 
formally approved his petition for membership. The Tribe cites 
the 1940 edition of Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
certain federal statutes unique to the Ute Tribal membership, 
and the Ute Tribal constitution as the sources for defining 
Perank's "Indian-ness". 
For the purpose of 18 U.S.C. §1151, e_t seq., federal 
courts have not solely relied upon whether a tribal government 
had conferred formal tribal membership. Instead, federal 
courts have uniformly and consistently looked to several 
factors, including whether the Defendant was racially Indian, 
whether he or she resided on an Indian reservation, whether he 
1
 The conclusion was triggered by an analysis of the 
burden of persuasion in the Brief of Respondent at 48-50 Utah 
v. Perank, No. 860196 (S. Ct. No. 860243) (Utah Ct. App. filed 
March 4, 1987), that need not be repeated here. 
or she held themselves out to be Indians, and whether he or she 
maintained tribal relations with the Indians residing on that 
reservation. See, Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 
1938), cert, denied, 306 U.S. 643 (1939); United States v. 
Ives, 504 P.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other 
grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1103 
(1977) (dicta); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 787 (8th 
Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1099; United States v. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646-47, n.7 (1977).2 
2
 See also, Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.N. 2d 425 at 438 
(Wise. 1983); State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426 at 431 (Idaho 1980); 
Bordeaux v. Hunt, 621 F. Supp. at 650 (SD 1985); Dillon v. 
Montana, 451 F. Supp. 168, 176 (D. Mont. 1978); United States 
v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846); Goforth v. 
Oklahoma, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. t. Crim. App. 1982); People 
ex rel Schuyler v. Livingstone, 123 Misc. 605, 205 N.Y.S. 888 
(Sup. St. 1924); United States v. Gardner, 189 F. 690 (E.D. 
Wis. 1911); In re Carmen's Petition, 165 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. 
Cal. 1958), aff'd. sub, nom. Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 
(9th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 361 U.S. 934 (1960); Duro v. 
Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987); Davis v. United States, 
32 F.2d 860 (ith Cir. 1929); Vialpando v. Wyoming, 640 P.2d 77 
(1982); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash. 2d 667, 
440 P.2d 442 (1968); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United States v. 
Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 
U.S. 841 (1978); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert, denied 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); Bureau of Revenue v. 
Fox, 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App.), cert, denied, 88 
N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975), cert, denied, 424 U.S. 933 
(1976); Greywater v. Joshua, et al., F.2d (8th 
Cir. ); Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 
73 (1977); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907), Simmons v. 
Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affd., 
384 U.S. 209 (1966), Mission Indians v. American Management and 
Amusement, Inc., 824 F.2d 710 at 723 (9th Cir. 1987), rehearing 
en banc, 840 F.2d 1394 at 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). See also, 
Administrative Appeal of Ogallala Sioux Tribe v. Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs and Richard Tall, PRU-10542 (Sept. 5, 1979); 
United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). 
State appellate courts have followed federal court decisions, 
but have generally determined a person's Indian status from the 
person's percent of Indian blood and his or her recognition as 
an Indian by federal or tribal governments, or by a society of 
Indians. See Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Ok. Cr. App. 
1982); Bureau of Revenue v. Fox, 531 P.2d 1234, 1235-36 (N.M. 
App. 1982), cert, denied; State v. Attebery, 519 P.2d 53, 54 
(Az. 1974); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, (1982 
edition) Ch. 1, Sec. C2 (p. 24). 
Wyoming has also concluded that non-enrollment of a 
person who is otherwise Indian is not conclusive as to that 
person's Indian status. In Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 79 
(Wyo. 1982), a defendant was a non-enrolled one-eighth (1/8) 
Shoshone Indian who received some federal privileges related to 
his Indian status and who attended some Indian cultural 
events. The defendant lived in a non-Indian community near the 
reservation. The Wyoming Supreme Court applied the Pero test 
for Indian-ness and concluded that the defendant failed to 
qualify as an Indian because he was not eligible for tribal 
membership, he did not maintain an Indian lifestyle, he did not 
live on the reservation, and he did not possess a substantial 
amount of Indian blood. 
A relatively recent analysis of criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian Country was reported in Clinton, Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 516 (1976). Mr. 
Clinton concluded: 
Courts look to a number of factors to 
determine whether a person is recognized as an 
Indian, with no single factor dispositive. 
Recognition might be by society as a whole, 
the Indian tribe, or the federal government. 
However, failure to be officially enrolled as 
a tribal member is not dispositive of Indian 
status for jurisdictional purposes. 18 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 503, 516 (1976). (emphasis added). 
Applying these well-established judicial criteria to 
the facts stated in the record, it must be concluded that 
Perank is an Indian for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §1153. 
Perank's Indian parents resided on the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation at the time of his birth. His father was a 
full-blooded, enrolled Ute Indian at the time of Perank's 
birth. Perank's mother was a mixed-blooded Indian of more than 
one tribe. Perank has lived his life as an Indian by 
maintaining social, political and spiritual relations as an 
Indian person, including participating in numerous Indian 
rituals, Affidavit of Clinton Perank, at 1, Utah v. Perank, 
Crim. Nos. 1121, 85-CR-301, 85-CR-302 (S. Ct. No. 860243) (7th 
D. Ct. of Duchesne County, Utah, filed April 17, 1986). 
R. . Also see, Affidavit of Wayne Perank and Affidavit of 
Mrs. Wayne Perank, Utah v. Perank, Crim. Nos. 1121, 85-CR301, 
85-CR-302 (S. Ct. No. 850243) (7th D. Ct. of Duchesne County, 
Utah, filed April 17, 1986). R. . The Appellant's brief 
states that: 
he . . . has lived his life as an Indian, and 
has been treated as an Indian by governmental 
entities. Appellant is recognized racially as 
an Indian. Brief of Appellant, at 10, Utah v. 
Perank, No. 860243 (Utah Sup. Ct., filed 
August 2, 1986). R. . 
Perank's affidavit in the trial court stated his 
lifestyle and, in essence, how he perceived himself. 
I've conducted my personal life and maintained 
a status social, political and spiritual as an 
Indian person, enjoying and participating in 
numerous Indian rituals and attempting to 
preserve my Indian heritage. Affidavit of 
Clinton Perank, at 1, Utah v. Perank, Crim. 
Nos. 1121, 85-CR-301, 85-CR-302 (S. Ct. No. 
860243) (7th D. Ct. of Duchesne County, Utah, 
filed April 17, 1986). R. . 
Perank's Indian status is very similar to that of Mr. 
Alvarado in United States v. Dodge, supra. Mr. Alvarado was 
determined to be a one-quarter (1/4) Yurok Indian by blood and 
was one who held himself out to others as an Indian. He had 
filed an application for tribal membership prior to the alleged 
crime, but his tribe had not yet approved his application. 
Those facts were enough for the 8th Circuit to find Alvarado an 
Indian for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §1153. 
Ex parte Pero, supra, is also instructive. There, the 
7th Circuit found that a criminal defendant was an Indian for 
the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. The defendant 
was the child of an unenrolled full-blood Indian mother and a 
one-half (1/2) blood Indian father. The defendant's parents 
were recognized as Indian and maintained tribal relations. The 
defendant resided on the reservation, maintained tribal 
relations, and was recognized by others as an Indian. The fact 
that the defendant and his mother were not enrolled was not 
determinative of his status as an Indian. 
While the Ute Tribe's brief leans heavily upon the 
fact that Perank was not enrolled as a tribal member at the 
time of the crime, the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646-47, n. 7 (1977), did not 
rely upon tribal membership as an absolute requirement for 
federal jurisdiction. That court cited Ex parte Pero, supra, 
and Ives, supra, for the view that if the Indian defendant 
lived on the reservation and maintained tribal relations with 
the Indians thereon, then they would qualify as Indians for the 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. §1153. However, that court did not 
decide whether non-enrolled Indians were subject to 18 U.S.C. 
§1153. 
The Ute Tribe's portrayal of Perank as a mixed blood 
Ute in this case is also misleading. The term "mixed blood 
Ute" is a word of art with congressionally delineated 
ramifications - none of which even arguably apply to Appellant 
- or any other enrolled or non-enrolled Indian of mixed blood 
3 
not listed on the mixed blood published roles. 
Appellant certainly is not a non-Indian. Appellant 
noted in the court below that he was unable to locate a single 
reported case "where an individual with more than one-half 
(1/2) Indian blood, such as Defendant, was found to be a 
3
 See, U.S. v. Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (D. Utah 
1982); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 
(1972), and Maldonado, et al. v. Hodel, et al., 683 F. Supp. 
1322 (1988). 
non-Indian." (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 6, Utah v. Perank, Crim. 
Nos. 1121, 85-CR-301, 85-CR-302 (S. Ct. No. 860243) (7th D.Ct. 
of Duchesne County, Utah, filed 1986)). R. . Amici have 
also reviewed reported cases to date and have not found such a 
case. Additionally, Appellant is an Indian under the 
definition set forth in the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, 25 
U.S.C. §479, See, F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
(1982 ed.) Ch. 1, Sec. B2e (p. 15). 
Lastly, Amici submit that the Ute Tribe's restrictive 
construction of its own jurisdiction is not supportive of the 
argument advanced. Federal law, not the tribal business 
committee, is the controlling factor on this issue. Moreover, 
Amici submit that a more candid view of the Tribe's 
interpretation of its Law and Order Code stands as a matter of 
record in the Brief of Utah Indian Tribe Amicus Curiae, 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Add. 
at 1. 
As to the case at bar, Perank has met all established 
criteria for being an Indian for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§1153. Although not described as a specific criteria, Perank 
also was qualified to be a tribal member from birth even though 
4 
he was not formally accepted until after the alleged crime. 
4
 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Ute Indian Tribe, at 4, Utah 
v. Perank, No. 860196 (s. Ct. No. 860243) (Utah S. Ct., filed 
July 19, 1988) . 
CONCLUSION 
The alleged crime by Perank was committed by an 
Indian, in an area not part of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
and, thus, not within Indian Country as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§1151. Clinton Perank is an Indian for the purposes of 18 
U.S.C. §1153. The lower court should be affirmed. 
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